A new start for Cuba

Posted on Fri, Dec. 15, 2006

AFTER CASTRO
A new start for Cuba
BY OSCAR ESPINOSA CHEPE

HAVANA -- The complete absence of Fidel Castro from the military parade
of Dec. 2 commemorating the 50th anniversary of his landing on the
island and from other official events honoring him early this month
marks the start of a new era for Cuba.

It becomes clearer that the man now in power in Cuba is his brother
Raúl, who has the support of the armed forces that he has led for almost
five decades. The problems that Raúl inherits are severe. In particular,
there is a loss of spiritual values among the citizenry and the fact
that the political credibility of the authorities has been severely
eroded by years of scarcity and unmet promises. Even in education,
public health and social security, where there had been relative
progress, there is a marked deterioration of conditions.

The situation is not much better in foreign affairs. The country's
political and economic isolation has become acute, with unreliable
relationships with Third World countries and a reliance on Venezuela to
sustain the Cuban economy with its oil.

Notwithstanding his undeniable historic prominence, Gen. Raúl Castro
does not have the charisma and political stature of his older brother,
as he himself has acknowledged. With a country in shambles that's facing
political, economic and social problems, the new leader has to chose
between two options: to continue doing nothing or to initiate a reform
process that will raise the standard of living of the population and
will allow Cuba to join the international community.

• The first option, by keeping the lid on Cubans' entrepreneurial
capacity, would have dire results for the country. It has already been
officially noted there is evidence of a rampant growth in corruption.
This, along with growing poverty, could provoke a social explosion in
which all Cubans would be the losers and that would even have a
destabilizing influence on neighboring countries.

• T he second option -- reform -- would entail the implementation of
economic measures that could eventually lead to longer-range political
changes. It can certainly be said that if long-suppressed productive
forces were liberated, there would be satisfactory results in short order.

On Dec. 2, Raúl Castro raised expectations when he signaled his
government's willingness to negotiate the normalization of relations
with U.S. authorities on the basis of mutual respect. Notwithstanding,
any negotiation, whether with the United States or with Europe, would
necessarily have to include a measure of good faith.

In the first place would be freeing political prisoners -- who are being
held in subhuman conditions. This would not entail any danger to the
Cuban government since these are nonviolent people whose interest is not
to destabilize the nation. To liberate them would be a positive gesture
that the world would acknowledge. Another step would be the ratification
by Cuba of the International Treaty of Political and Civil Rights and
the International Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which
most countries around the world have signed.

The United States could also take steps to promote confidence and trust
toward eventual negotiations. One such would be the elimination of
restrictions on family visits by Cubans on both sides of the Florida
Straits, another the strengthening of academic, cultural, artistic and
sports contacts between the two countries.

Undoubtedly, along with the problems, the new government inherits a
legacy of ideology from which it cannot divest itself, even if it wanted
to, for reasons of legitimacy. Fidel Castro has been a decisive factor
in Cuban history for the last 50 years during which he has held almost
absolute power.

The choices for a new direction in government are clear: Stay the
course, or implement reforms that will lead to a prosperous, democratic
reconciliation for the nation.

Oscar Espinosa Chepe is an independent Cuban journalist in Cuba.

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