Is Chavez Cuba's kingmaker

Is Chavez Cuba's kingmaker?
(By DANIEL P ERIKSON)

JUST DAYS BEFORE Fidel Castro's ailing health grabbed world headlines,
the Cuban leader was Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's surprise guest
at a South American summit in Argentina. The two leaders traveled to the
boyhood home of Ernesto "Che" Guevara, the revolutionary icon. Chavez
appeared moved by the visit. "For me," he said, "it is truly an honor to
be here, walking through history." But Chavez has already joined Che
where it counts most – on billboards in Havana, where the Cuban
government lauds its heroes.

Chavez is indeed a hero in Cuba, especially to its longtime leader. Over
the last seven years, he has become Castro's key economic benefactor and
political partner. That relationship has stirred concern among US
policymakers that Chavez might meddle in the post-Castro transition.

There's no question that he has sufficient leverage in Cuba to
potentially influence the choice of the island's next leader – and his
blessing will certainly be crucial to the next Cuban government's
success or failure. Whether he will wield his influence is unknown, and
Cuba, of course, is a sovereign nation. But Washington's worry that he
will clearly reverses the conventional wisdom of only a few years ago,
when the Venezuelan leader was seen as a creation of Castro.

The sources of Chavez's potential leverage in Cuba's transition are
multiple. The most important is the "oil for services" pact that he and
Castro signed in October 2000 and that continues to expand.

Cuba receives more than 90,000 barrels of Venezuela crude a day at
favorable rates of financing in exchange for deploying an estimated
20,000 doctors in Venezuela. Although the presence of Cuban doctors has
deepened Chavez's support among his country's poor, the arrangement has
yielded extraordinary benefits for Castro as well. Over the last six
years, oil prices have more than tripled, from $20 to about $76 a
barrel. Not only has Cuba avoided oil sticker shock, it has received a
modest windfall. In 2005, bilateral trade between the two countries
reached $2.5bn, including $1.8bn in Venezuelan oil sales to Cuba on
deferred financing plans – and nonpayment by Cuba is the norm.

Cuba and Venezuela's deep security and intelligence cooperation in
recent years also contributes to Chavez's influence in Cuba. Chavez has
embraced Cuban military doctrine, which includes the development of a
2-million-member Venezuelan reservist force to counter the perceived
threat of US aggression. New laws give Cuban officials wide latitude to
conduct security activities in Venezuela, and Venezuelan military
personnel have cultivated strong relationships with their Cuban
counterparts. In the future, the specter of Venezuelan military
intervention in Cuba – even if farfetched – further diminishes the
already-negligible enthusiasm US military officials have for a Cuban
adventure.

Aside from billboards, the Cuban state media covers Chavez as if he were
a member of Castro's Cabinet. Cuban and Venezuelan flags often appear
together at official ceremonies on the island, and the thousands of
Venezuelans visiting Cuba for medical treatment or ideological training
underscore the bond between the two leaders. Chavez's elder brother,
Adan, who until this month was Venezuelan ambassador to Havana, skipped
many of the diplomatic functions other foreign embassies depend on for
communicating with the Cuban government because he already had direct
access to the highest levels of power.

During a visit to Caracas last fall, Carlos Lage Davila, Cuba's vice
president and a potential successor to Castro, raised eyebrows when he
declared that "we have two presidents: Fidel and Chavez." Hyperbole,
yes. But he undoubtedly wanted to communicate his government's gratitude
for continued Venezuelan support.

Finally, in addition to more than one-third of Cuba's doctors, Venezuela
is host to thousands of Cuban educators, sports trainers and security
personnel. These individuals make up a significant percentage of the
well-trained human capital that represents the crown jewel of Cuba's
socialist revolution. When Castro dies, Chavez will have to decide how
to deal with these Cubans in Venezuela. If he sends them home, there may
be no jobs for them, which could be socially destabilising.

Washington has few tools to counter Chavez in Cuba. In a recent report
on the island, the Bush administration concluded that "the current
regime in Havana is working with like-minded governments, particularly
Venezuela, to build a network of political and financial support
designed to forestall any external pressure to change." After Castro's
surgery was made public, the administration quickly ruled out any
dialogue with the new Cuban government, instead continuing the sanctions
policy that has left Washington without any effective leverage in Cuban
affairs.

Still, Washington's anxiety about Venezuela's influence in a post-Castro
Cuba illustrates how completely Chavez occupies center stage in US
policy toward Latin America. Over the last several years, the US has
elevated Chavez's stature from that of a strictly Venezuelan political
phenomenon to one of a continental menace whose maneuverings are
responsible – correctly or not – for every development that goes against
Washington's interests. He, not Castro, is the presumed hemispheric
boogeyman behind Latin America's burgeoning left-wing movements.

Castro's template for Latin American leadership has captivated the
Venezuelan leader since his earliest days in power. Chavez has learned
from Castro how to build a virtually indestructible power base at home
while winning friends and admirers around the world.

Most important, Castro has demonstrated that crossing swords with the
United States can be a good career move. If the US detects his hand in
the selection of Cuba's next leader, Chavez may be betting that roiling
the US will benefit him as well.

(Erikson is senior associate for US policy at the Inter-American
Dialogue. He is co-editor of Transforming Socialist Economies: Lessons
for Cuba and Beyond.)
-Lat-WP

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