CUBA'S TRANSITION

CUBA'S TRANSITION

Wednesday, August 09, 2006

WASHINGTON—Whether Fidel Castro's condition is terminal or not, Cuba's
transition has begun. Nobody at this stage knows what kind of transition
it will be or how long it will take, but the symbolism of Fidel Castro
handing over power to his brother is sufficient to tell us that half a
century of one-man rule on the island is over. Whatever happens next,
this will not be Fidel Castro's dictatorship.

So, what kind of transition will this be? There are five possible
scenarios for a communist regime, at least three of which no longer seem
possible in Cuba. The three that are highly unlikely are the Chinese
model, the Polish model and the Soviet model.

The Chinese model, also followed by Vietnam, involves the combination of
communist political dictatorship and a market economy of sorts. Fidel
Castro toyed with that idea in the 1990s when the end of the Soviet
subsidy caused the collapse of the Cuban economy. He went back on the
mild reforms as soon as he realized they would lead to a
decentralization of economic power. This type of transition can either
be led by someone with unquestionable political legitimacy in the eyes
of the regime, as was the case of Deng Xiaoping in China, or by a group
of pragmatists after the death of the legitimate leader, as was the case
with the Vietnamese pragmatists after the death of Le Duan in the
mid-1980s. Raul Castro, Fidel's chosen successor, does not have the kind
of legitimacy that Fidel had and would not be able to undo his brother's
economic legacy without causing the collapse of the dictatorship.

The Polish model involves a Communist leader willing to hand power over
to the opposition—as Wojciech Jaruzelski did in 1989, opening the doors
to the emergence of Tadeusz Mazowiecki as prime minister. My Cuban
friends tell me Raul Castro attempted to introduce some reform in the
armed forces in the 1980s on the basis of "efficiency and pragmatism"
and his brother ordered him to stop. However, Raul's long history of
repression makes him an unlikely Jaruzelski. Raul was personally
involved in many of the executions in the early stages of the
Revolution, has been instrumental in purging and punishing, sometimes
with the death penalty, generals the regime considered suspect, and has
followed a Stalinist line to this day.

The Soviet model entails a bureaucratic transition in which the party
leadership as a body undertakes a degree of openness and structural
reform. Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership acquired such personal dimensions
that we often forget he was a creature of a collective decision to
engage in reform. That process ultimately evolved into Western-style
political leadership. The problem with this model in the case of Cuba is
that the bureaucrats in charge are still the original revolutionary
tyrants. In the communique through which Fidel handed over power to Raul
on Tuesday, a few names were mentioned, particularly those of Jose
Machado Ventura and Jose Ramon Balaguer. Both are septuagenarian
"Raulistas" who fought in the Sierra Maestra.

This leaves two possible transitions. One would be "Fidelismo" without
Fidel. In other words, a military dictatorship under Raul Castro—who at
75 is frail and suffers from cirrhosis due to alcoholism—until he passes
away or becomes incapacitated himself, at which time the real transition
process would begin. His regime would survive, much like Fidel Castro's
has survived in the new millennium, thanks to oil and cash from his pal,
Hugo Chavez of Venezuela.

The other, more likely, scenario is a power struggle among various
factions. Cuban General Jose Quevedo recently told a group of Cubans in
Madrid that the degree of personal control by Fidel Castro has been such
that no one with any kind of following has emerged these past few years
in the armed forces or the Communist Party. Aside from Raul's limited
legitimacy stemming from his long history as a revolutionary and his
anointment by Fidel, no one is in a position to command respect.
Considering Raul's age and health, this means a power struggle among
factions is likely. Divisions will emerge between the old guard and the
younger "apparatchiks," between those who have ties to Chavez and those
who resent foreign meddling, and between those who favor maintaining
things as they are and those who want to start a transition toward
democracy and free markets.

We don't know at this stage whether that struggle will be violent or
purely political. But we know that the most important thing that needed
to happen—that is, Fidel Castro's demise—is happening right now. Now
freedom at least has a fighting chance on the island.

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