Bet on dictatorship

Posted on Wed, Aug. 23, 2006

CUBA
Bet on dictatorship
BY JAIME SUCHLICKI
cubanaffairs@miami.edu

Fidel Castro is fighting his last battle -- one that he cannot win. He
will not elude death. Cuba is witnessing the end of the Fidelista era
and the beginning of a Raúlista one. Power has passed into the hands of
the younger brother. Succession now seems irreversible.

Questions remain: What can Raúl hope to accomplish within the existing
sociopolitical and economic context? More important, what options in
domestic and foreign affairs are open to Cuba's new leaders? What are
the chances that they will be unable or unwilling to exercise any major
options at all? Will they fear upsetting the multilevel balance of
interests upon which a new government will depend?

Raúl faces significant challenges: a nonproductive economy highly
dependent on Venezuela and other foreign sources; popular unhappiness;
the need to maintain order and discipline among the population; and the
need to increase productivity. Raúl is critically dependent on the
military. Lacking his brother's charisma, he will also need the support
of key party leaders and technocrats within the government bureaucracy.

The critical challenge for a Raúl Castro regime will be to balance the
need to improve the economy and satisfy the needs of the population with
maintaining political control. Too-rapid economic reforms may lead to an
unraveling of political control, an outcome feared by Raúl, the military
and other allies keen on remaining in power. An initial solution may be
to provide more consumer goods to the population, including food, but
without any structural economic changes.

Similarly, serious overtures to the United States seem unlikely in the
near future. Such an approach would mean the rejection of one of Fidel
Castro's main legacies: anti-Americanism. This could create uncertainty
within the Raúl Castro government leading to frictions and factionalism
and would require the weakening of Cuba's anti-American alliance with
radical regimes in Latin America, Iran and Syria.

From Cuba's point of view, the United States has little to offer:
American tourists, which Raúl doesn't want or need; American
investments, which he fears may subvert his highly centralized and
controlled economy; and products that he can buy cheaper from other
countries. Furthermore, the United States does not have the ability to
provide Cuba with the petroleum that Venezuela is sending at little or
no cost.

U.S. recognition may mean a great victory for Raúl and the
legitimization of his regime. Yet it's a small prize when compared to
the uncertainties that a Cuba-U.S. relation may produce internally and
externally among Cuba's allies.

Raúl Castro is no Mikhail Gorbachev or Deng Xiaoping. With Fidel alive
-- and even when he is gone -- Raúl is not likely to embark on major
economic or political reforms. Forty-seven years as minister of defense
has hardened him into a Stalinist military man more than a liberal
reformer. Whether the Raúlista era lasts a long period or not, Cubans
seem destined to endure difficult times and a harsh military dictatorship.

Jaime Suchlicki is director of the Institute for Cuban and
Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami.

http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/opinion/15337774.htm