CUBA THE THREAT II

CUBA THE THREAT II

CYBERTERRORISM AND CYBERWAR

Dr. Manuel Cereijo *
Colaboración
La Nueva Cuba
May 16, 2006

What is cyberterrorism?

Terrorism that involves computers, networks, and the information they
contain. Computer networks have been attacked during recent conflicts in
Kosovo, Kashmir, and the Middle East, but the damage has mostly been
limited to defaced Web sites or blocked Internet servers. However, with
American society increasingly interconnected and ever more dependent on
information technology, terrorism experts worry that cyberterrorist
attacks could cause as much devastation as more familiar forms of terrorism.

Is the United States vulnerable to cyberterrorism?

Yes, but experts disagree about how large and immediate a threat
cyberterrorism poses. In 1997, the Pentagon simulated a cyberattack and
found that attackers using ordinary computers and widely available
software could disrupt military communications, electrical power, and
911 networks in several American cities. Hacking tools and expertise
have become only more widespread since then.

Is cyberterrorism the same as hacking?

No. While some people use the term “cyberterrorism” (which was coined in
the 1980s) to refer to any major computer-based attack on the U.S.
government or economy, many terrorism experts would not consider
cyberattacks by glory-seeking individuals, organizations with criminal
motives, or hostile governments engaging in information warfare to be
cyberterrorism. Like other terrorist acts, cyberterror attacks are
typically premeditated, politically motivated, perpetrated by small
groups rather than governments, and designed to call attention to a
cause, spread fear, or otherwise influence the public and decision-makers.

Hackers break in to computer systems for many reasons, often to display
their own technical prowess or demonstrate the fallibility of computer
security. Some on-line activists say that activities such as defacing
Web sites are disruptive but essentially nonviolent, much like civil
disobedience.

Why would terrorists turn to cyberattacks?

Terrorists try to leverage limited resources to instill fear and shape
public opinion, and dramatic attacks on computer networks could provide
a means to do this with only small teams and minimal funds. Moreover,
“virtual” attacks over the Internet or other networks allow attackers to
be far away, making borders, X-ray machines, and other physical barriers
irrelevant. Cyberterrorists would not need a complicit or weak
government (as al-Qaeda had in Afghanistan) to host them as they train
and plot. On-line attackers can also cloak their true identities and
locations, choosing to remain anonymous or pretending to be someone else.

Terrorists might also try to use cyberattacks to amplify the effect of
other attacks. For example, they might try to block emergency
communications or cut off electricity or water in the wake of a
conventional bombing or a biological, chemical, or radiation attack.
Many experts say that this kind of coordinated attack might be the most
effective use of cyberterrorism.

What kinds of attacks are considered cyberterrorism?

Cyberterrorism could involve destroying the actual machinery of the
information infrastructure; remotely disrupting the information
technology underlying the Internet, government computer networks, or
critical civilian systems such as financial networks or mass media; or
using computer networks to take over machines that control traffic
lights, power plants, or dams in order to wreak havoc.

How do cyberattacks work?

Attacks on the physical components of the information infrastructure
would resemble other conventional attacks: for example, a bomb could be
used to destroy a government computer bank, key components of the
Internet infrastructure, or telephone switching equipment. Another
option would be an electromagnetic weapon emitting a pulse that could
destroy or interrupt electronic equipment.

Attacks launched in cyberspace could involve diverse methods of
exploiting vulnerabilities in computer security: computer viruses,
stolen passwords, insider collusion, software with secret “back doors”
that intruders can penetrate undetected, and orchestrated torrents of
electronic traffic that overwhelm computers—which are known as “denial
of service” attacks. Attacks could also involve stealing classified
files, altering the content of Web pages, disseminating false
information, sabotaging operations, erasing data, or threatening to
divulge confidential information or system weaknesses unless a payment
or political concession is made. If terrorists managed to disrupt
financial markets or media broadcasts, an attack could undermine
confidence or sow panic.

Attacks could also involve remotely hijacking control systems, with
potentially dire consequences: breaching dams, colliding airplanes,
shutting down the power grid, and so on.

Could cyberterrorists really take control of a dam or a power plant?

Yes, although experts disagree as to how likely this is, and in any
case, such a feat would be considerably harder to pull off than defacing
a Web site or launching a denial of service attack. If the device that
controls such a system such as a dam or power plant is connected to the
Internet, it would theoretically be vulnerable to cyberhijacking,
although terrorists would still need to find a way to exploit the
security vulnerabilities of such machines, perhaps with help from a
conspirator on the inside. In 2000, hackers working with a former
employee of Gazprom, the major Russian energy company, reportedly
briefly took control of the computer systems that govern the flow of
natural gas through the company’s pipelines.

Does al-Qaeda have cyberterrorist capabilities?

We don’t know. Osama bin Laden’s terror network uses the Internet,
encryption software, and other up-to-date information technology to link
its members, plan attacks, raise funds, and spread propaganda. But using
the Internet is much easier than inflicting damage through the Internet.
That said, U.S. officials reportedly think that al-Qaeda has been
training members in cyberattack techniques, and U.S. computer logs and
data from computers seized in Afghanistan both indicate that the group
has scouted systems that control American energy facilities, water
distribution, communication systems, and other critical infrastructure.
In what may be a related development, a Pakistani group hacked into an
antiterrorist Web site after September 11, posting messages expressing
support for al-Qaeda and threatening to attack U.S. military Web sites.
But we don’t know whether the group has ties to al-Qaeda.

Which other terrorist groups could launch cyberattacks?

We don’t know how many groups have the know-how. The Tamil Tigers have
mounted on-line attacks against the government of Sri Lanka. The
Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo, which released sarin gas in the
Tokyo subway system in 1995, had previously built a system for tracking
Japanese police vehicles, and investigators discovered that the group
possessed classified data regarding these vehicles. Other foreign
terrorist organizations also use the Internet for communications and
propaganda, but it’s hard to know who has cyberterrorist capabilities
until they try something. Cyberattacks often lack the drama of
traditional terrorist attacks, so they might not be attractive to some
terrorist groups.

Could terrorist groups get help from hackers?

Yes. Rather than developing their own computer skills, terrorist groups
might try to hire or trick unaffiliated hackers into helping. Experts
are particularly worried about highly skilled and underpaid computer
specialists from the former Soviet Union. Hackers who dislike America
might also decide to perpetrate an attack independently. Following the
April 2001 collision of a U.S. Navy spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet,
Chinese hackers launched denial of service attacks against American Web
sites.

Could states that sponsor terrorism help cyberterrorists?

Conceivably, although highly skilled individual hackers would probably
offer better help. The assets states can offer terrorists—funding,
training, logistical support, and so on—would matter less for most
cyberattacks than for attacks involving conventional weapons or weapons
of mass destruction.

Are any state sponsors of terrorism capable of waging war in cyberspace?

Yes. According to a report by Dartmouth University’s Institute for
Security Technology Studies, at least four of the seven countries listed
by the State Department as sponsors of terrorism have cyberwarfare
programs: North Korea and Cuba are developing them. Cuba has the Bejucal
Base, capable of producing cyber attacks. Many other countries,
including the United States, Russia, and China, have cyberwarfare
programs as part of their military apparatuses.

What can be done to protect against cyberterrorism?

Experts stress vigilance about computer security: patching security
flaws quickly once they’re detected, designing systems to withstand
attacks, backing up systems off-site so they can bounce back quickly
from a disruption, watching for disgruntled employees who might help
terrorists penetrate a system.

What is the U.S. government doing to protect against cyberterrorism?

Most of America’s information infrastructure is privately owned and
administered, so any government effort requires coordination and
information sharing with the private sector. In 1998, the FBI
established the National Infrastructure Protection Center to assess
cyberthreats and improve communication between government and private
information-security officials. Other law enforcement agencies and
military branches also have programs to defend the national information
infrastructure.

Can individual computer users do anything to combat cyberterrorism?

Yes. Individual computer owners can become unwitting accomplices to
denial of service attacks. Information technology experts say that
maintaining good security—using a firewall and virus protection
software, avoiding suspicious email and programs—can help prevent or
minimize cyberattacks.

Cuba: The Threat

Cuba is not a challenge or a threat to the United States with
conventional weapons on a conventional battlefield. It never was, not
even at its military peak of the 1970's. However, Cuba is a real threat
to the United States with non-traditional weapons.

Background

Cuba has surprising talent and experience in the areas of electronics,
computers, computer software and data processing. The country benefited
from its association with the former Soviet Union, and some European
countries, which turned out many skilled electrical and computer
engineers, as well as technicians.

Cuba's electronic industry has its origins in the mid-1960s when the
Ministry for Iron and Steel Machinery (SIME) began assembly of radios
from imported parts. In 1974 SIME started producing black-and-white
television sets. Then came a plant to produce batteries (1975),
telephone switchboards (1981), and color television sets (1985). In 1985
SIME also started production of semiconductors.

In 1976 a separate electronics institute was created, the National
Institute of Automated Systems and Computer Skills (INSAC). In 1994
INSAC was incorporated into the newly created Ministry of Steel, Heavy
Machinery and Electronics. The Ministry of Communications is also
responsible for small-scale production of certain electronics-related
products.

The entity Cuba Electronica was created in January 1986 as part of the
Foreign Trade Ministry. It is responsible for importing electronic
equipment and exporting computers, peripherals, semiconductors and software.

An Irish expert says that the Cuban information-technology industry
matches that of the Republic of Ireland, which has been particularly
successful in persuading a range of information technology companies to
establish their European base in Cuba.

One of the most advanced areas of the electronics industry in Cuba is
production of medical equipment. The Central Institute for Digital
Research (ICID), in collaboration with the Biotechnology Centers, has
developed high technology medical equipment including the Cardiocid-M,
an electrocardiographic system for diagnosing cardiovascular system
diseases; Neorocid, an electromyographic and electro-neurographic system
for diagnosing peripheric nervous system diseases, and various
applications for high- technology genetic engineering research.

The main developments of Cuba's electronic industry occurred between
1975 and 1989. Among others:

· Computer equipment plant, established in 1978, with a 4,300 square
meters production area

· Printed circuit board plant, established 1982, with a 4,900 square
meters production area

· Electronic modules production plant, with 4,000 square meters
production area

· Mechanical production plant, with 7,500 square meters production area

· Monitors and television set plant, established in 1975, with an annual
capacity of 100,000 units

· Alphanumeric keyboards plant, established in 1988, equipped to produce
keyboards compatible with IBM, DEC and other microcomputer systems.
Production capacity of 250,000 units per year

· Printed circuit boards plant, which can produce 35,000 square meters
per year of circuit boards. It uses Betamax material and carries out the
printing by serigraphy.

· Electronic Research and Development Center, established in 1985.

· Electronic Components Complex, (CCE), produces active and passive
components, established in 1985.

· Medical equipment complex, established in 1989. Produces instruments
and equipment for the Biotechnology Centers.

Computing in Cuba dates back to the mid- 1950s when two first generation
U.S. computers were installed. During the 1960s came computers from
France, followed by Soviet and East- European systems. During the 1970s
Cuba embarked on a program to develop its own second minicomputers based
on Digital's PDP-11.

Most of Cuba's early computer specialists were trained in East Germany
and the Soviet Union. In mid 1980s two main centers of computational
research were established one at the CUJAE and the other at Universidad
Central de Las Villas.

Cuba has also developed computer networks. Presently, there are four
networks with international connectivity: CENIAI, Tinored, CIGBnet,
Infomed. CENIAI began networking in 1986, and has had a UUCP link to the
Internet since 1992. They currently offer email, database access, and
programming and consulting services. CIGBnet is the network of the
Center for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology. It began in 1991 and
provides email, database access, a biological sequence server.

Since 1991, there has been a surplus of electrical and computer
engineers in Cuba due to the closing of many industries. Many of these
engineers changed their lines of work to the areas of telecommunications
espionage and computer interference and disruption, in special centers
created by the government.

A large group of them received specialized training in Russia, Vietnam,
North Korea and China As a result, a significant engineering and
technical staff is now dedicated to research, development and
application on these areas.

The Beginning

Prior to the August 1991 coup attempt, the KGB was developing computer
viruses with the intent of using them to disrupt computer systems in
times of war or crisis. In early 1991, a highly restricted project was
undertaken by a group within the Military Intelligence Directorate of
Cuba's Ministry of the Armed Forces.

The group was instructed to obtain information to develop a computer
virus to infect U.S. civilian computers. The group spent about $5,000
dollars to buy open-source data on computer networks, computer viruses,
SATCOM, and related communications technology. These efforts have
continued to be made, now in a much larger scale, and could potentially
cause irreparable harm to U.S. defense system.

The project is under the direction of Major Guillermo Bello, and his
wife, Colonel Sara Maria Jordan, both of the Ministry of the Interior.
Several well- known Cuban engineers were sent to work in this group. The
engineering effort is led by engineers Sergio Suarez, Amado Garcia, and

Jose Luis Presmanes. Several computational centers have been created at
either universities or research centers through Cuba, where highly
secret research and development activities are conducted. The
developments of malicious software requires little in the way of
resources- a few computers and an individual or group with the
appropriate expertise-making a malicious software R&D program easy to
support as well as to hide.

According to reports, Dutch teenagers gained access, apparently through
an Internet connection to computer systems at 34 DOD sites, including
the Air Force Weapons Laboratory, the David Taylor Research Center, the
Army Information Systems Command, and the Navy Ocean Systems Center
during operations Desert Shield Storm.

They were snooping in sensitive rather than classified military
information. The intrusions normally involved broad-base keywords
searches including such words as "rockets", "missiles", and "weapons".

They exploited a trap door to permit future access and modified and
copied military information to unauthorized accounts on U.S. university
systems. Although no "customer" was identified, the data collected could
have been sent electronically anywhere in the world. At that time, some
Cuban engineers were receiving specialized training in Holland, Sweden,
and Austria.

Cuba: Low Energy Radio Frequency

It is quite possible, and probable, that Cuba is doing research and
development on low level radio frequency weapons, or LERF. This
technology utilizes relatively low energy, which is spread over a wide
frequency spectrum. It can, however, be no less effective in disrupting
normal functioning of computers as the high energy RF, or HERF due to
the high probability that its wide spectrum contains frequencies
matching resonance frequencies of critical components.

Generally, the LERF approach does not require time compression, nor does
it utilize high tech components. LERF impact on computers and computer
networks could be devastating. One of the dangerous aspects of a LERF
attack on a computer is that an unprotected computer would go into a
"random output mode".

Different kinds of LERF weapons have already been used over the years,
primarily in Eastern Europe. This is one of the reasons it is highly
probable that Cuba is active in the development of such weapons. For
instance, during the Czechoslovakian invasion of 1968, the Soviet
military received advanced notice that Czechoslovakian anti-communist
activities had been wary of relying on the telephone communications.

These telephone communications were controlled by the government. They
prepared to use radio transceivers to communicate between their groups
for coordination of their resistance efforts.

During the invasion Soviet military utilized RF jamming aircraft from
the Soviet air force base in Stryi, Western Ukraine. The aircraft jammed
all the radio spectrum, with the exception of a few narrow
pre-determined "windows" of RF spectrum utilized by the invading Soviet
army.

Another example of a LERF attack was the KGB's manipulation of the
United States Embassy security system in Moscow in the mid-80s. The
security system alarm was repeatedly falsely triggered by the KGB's
induced RF interference several times during the night. This was intent
to annoy and fatigue the marines and to cause the turning of the
"malfunctioning" system off.

A small group of agents from Cuba, well trained, can put components from
Radio Shack, for example, inside a van or a pick up truck, with an
antenna. And that is really what an RF weapon looks like, a radar or
antenna showing, and drive it around a building, be the White House, the
Pentagon, or the FAA facility and pulse.

They can fire, and re-fire, as long as the generator has power. The
radiation goes through concrete walls. Barriers are not resistant to
them. They will either burn out or upset all the computers or the
electronic gear of the targeted building. They are absolutely safe to
human beings.

Another aspect of offensive RF technology is its traditional application
in information intercept or eavesdropping. Traditionally, the Soviet
Union and Russia have placed high priority on the development and use of
this technology. Changes of last decade in Russia impacted the KGB,
which has been split into independent parts.

The 8th and 16th Directorates, roughly representing Russian equivalent
of the NSA, became an independent agency, the Federal Agency of
Government Communications and Information (FAPSI). FAPSI is directly
subordinate to the President of Russia.

In a wave of privatization, FAPSI was partially privatized as well. Some
of the leading FAPSI experts left the agency and founded private
security companies. These companies are fully capable of carrying out
any offensive operations and serve as consultants to previous ally
countries.

There is also a close cooperation between FAPSI and its private spin-off
companies. The private companies can provide the FAPSI with some of the
products of their intercept, while FAPSI can also share some of its
products, along with personnel and equipment, including its powerful and
sophisticated facilities, such as the Lourdes in Cuba, for a very
productive long-range intercept.

This situation can easily put American private business in a highly
unfavorable competitive position since the end of the Cold War somewhat
shifted goals, objectives, and some targets of the FAPSI toward a
heavier emphasis on intercept of technological, commercial and financial
information.

It can take a few days to build a LERF weapon. It takes a few weeks or a
few months to establish a successful collection of information through
RF intercept. But several countries, including Cuba, have the capacity
to do so.

Cuba: Lourdes Base (dismantled in 2002)

At Lourdes, a suburb of La Habana, south of Centro Habana, and close to
Jose Marti's airport, there is a Russian sophisticated electronic
espionage base. It encompasses a 28 square mile area and employs some
1,500 Russian engineers, technicians and staff. A satellite view of
Lourdes, 1996, is included.

There are two fields of satellite dishes. One group listens in to
general U.S. communications. The second group is used for targeted
telephones and devices. The areas are designated "Space Associated
Electronics Area North" and "Space Associated Electronics Area South".
There is also an HO/Administration Area, and a Vehicle/Equipment
Maintenance Area.

The Russians have spent over $3 billion dollars on Lourdes. In 1996 they
started to upgrade the facilities, in some $250 million dollars.
Presently, they have state- of- the art equipment. The computers at the
base are programmed to listen for specific phone numbers-when they
detect these lines are in use the computers automatically record the
conversations on transmissions.

The upgrading now includes voice recognition facilities, that is,
computers recognize certain targeted voice spectrum, and when so, they
automatically record the conversations. Also facsimiles are detected, as
well as computer data.

At present, Lourdes is an even more important asset for Russia in its
efforts to spy on the United States than it was during the Cold war.
Lourdes receives and collects intercepts by spy satellites, ships and
planes in the Atlantic region, making it a full fledge regional command
and control center.

The use of the intelligence garnered by Lourdes is not limited to
penetrating secret U.S. military operations. Its targets also include
the interception of sensitive diplomatic, commercial and economic
traffic, and private U.S. telecommunications.

The strategic significance of the Lourdes facility also has grown
dramatically since the order from Russian Federation President, Boris
Yeltsin, of February 7, 1996 demanding that the Russian intelligence
community step up the theft of American and other Western economic and
trade secrets.

The director of the Defense Intelligence Agency told the Senate
Intelligence Committee in August 1996, "Lourdes is being used to collect
personal information about U.S. citizens in the private and government
sectors". The signal intelligence complexes operated by Russia at
Lourdes also offers the means by which to engage in cyberwarfare against
the United States.

Cuba: Bejucal Base

In 1995, Russia started the construction of an espionage base to be
operated by the Cubans. The base is located at Bejucal, south of La
Habana. The agreement, and the supervision of the entire project, was
directed by General Guillermo Rodriguez del Pozo. Equipment for the base
was shipped secretively from Russia through the port of Riga, in Latvia.
This country does not have an embassy in Cuba. However, Cuba maintains a
large embassy, over 50 persons, in Latvia.

The base is now fully operational, similar but smaller than Lourdes, and
with all state-of-the-art equipment. The unit is referred to by some as
The Electronic Warfare Battalion, EWB. The request for the base came
because Cuba does not have access to Lourdes. They only get copies of
the Russian intelligence summaries on issues that could affect the
nation's security.

Cuba Bejucal's Base is very powerful, and it has the capabilities,
besides running signals intelligence operations, that is, eavesdropping,
of conducting cyberwarfare. The Interior Ministry's General Directorate
for Intelligence is in charge of the Base.

It also runs a smaller center, located at Paseo, between 11th and 13th
streets, in Vedado, La Habana. The center is mainly radio listening and
transmitting, and for limited telephone espionage.

The Electronic Warfare Battalion has the necessary equipment to
interfere Radio and TV Marti, and the equipment to interfere TV Marti if
it transmits in UHF. The equipment is not used as yet. However, the base
has offensive jamming capabilities, capable of disrupting communications
deep inside the United States. This is indeed a unique facility because
of its size and location and capability.

Interference of Radio and TV Marti is now disseminated through the
Island, in what is called project Titan. In charge now of Chinese
personnel, which since March 1999 has also taken partially over the
operations of the Bejucal base, or EWB.

Early in 1999, the Pentagon's military computer systems were subject to
ongoing, sophisticated and organized cyber attacks. Officials stated
that this latest series of strikes at defense networks was a coordinated
effort coming from abroad. Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre, who
oversees all Pentagon security matters, confirmed the attacks have been
occurring since 1998.

Secretary Hamre called them a "major concern." Officials believe some of
the most sophisticated attacks are coming from a country routing through
Russian computer addresses to disguise their origin.

The probes and attacks are also against U.S. military research and
technology systems-including the nuclear weapons laboratories run by the
Department of Energy. Rep. Curt Weldon, R-Pa., chairman of the House
Armed Services research and Development Subcommittee stated "What we
have been seeing in recent months is more of what could be a coordinated
attack...that could be involved in a very planned effort to acquire
technology and information about our systems in a way that we have not
seen before."

These attacks coincide with the fact that the Bejucal base is fully
operational, and also with the new presence of China military and
intelligence personnel in Cuba.

Rep. Curtis Weldon also stated "it is not a matter of if America has an
electronic Pearl Harbor, it is a matter of when". For two days in
January, 1999, cyber attacks were made into military computers at Kelly
Air Force Base in San Antonio-the center for the most sensitive Air
Force intelligence, the kind of information critical to American troops
abroad.

Joseph Santos, also known as "Mario", one of the persons arrested by the
FBI in an alleged spy ring, on September 1998, is an electrical and
computer engineer, with great expertise in computer networks, and member
until 1996 of a research computational center in a University in Cuba.

According to the indictment, Santos' assignment was to infiltrate the
new U.S. Southern Command headquarters in West Dade. He had, as his
fundamental assignment, the penetration of the headquarters of said
command. Maps of several cities, including San Antonio, were found in
his apartment. It is a fact that Lourdes, Wajay, Santiago’s farm, and
the EBW bases, are a threat to the U.S. security, capable of
intercepting not only U.S. military secrets but also commercial and
trade intelligence.

Typical Antennas as in Bejucal

Former Lourdes Base (Dismantled)

Cuba: the new China presence

In February, 1999, a top level Chinese military delegation, led by Chi
Haotian, Defense Minister, visited Cuba. They met several times with
Raul Castro, Cuba's Defense Minister. It was the first time a Chinese
Minister of Defense visited Cuba.

China's President Jiang Zemin visited Cuba in 1993. Castro went to China
in 1995. Other important visits have occurred recently. Raul Castro,
accompanied by several generals, visited China. Also, general Dong Liang
Ju, head of China's Military Commission, visited Cuba.

An important role here is played again by General Guillermo Rodriguez
del Pozo, whose son is married to Raul Castro's daughter. All these
facts lead to an important conclusion: a very close military relation
between Cuba and China.

It is obvious that China sees a presence in Cuba of an important
strategic value, and is making Cuba a military and intelligence
gathering Center. What Cuba really wants from China? Most probably,
economic assistance. But the real important question is what China wants
from Cuba?

China has become very active in Cuba's military telecommunications,
cyberwarfare and biowarfare activities. China is investing to modernize
the satellite- tracking center at Jaruco. China is heavily involved also
in the telecommunications-monitoring base at Paseo, between 11th st and
13th st, Vedado.

The government of China has created the 863 and Super-863 Programs, with
the sole mission of importing technologies for military use. The 863
program was given a budget split between military and civilian projects,
focusing on science and technology.

The following are key areas of military concern: biological warfare;
communications and intelligence systems. The People's Liberation Army,
PLA, has placed priority on the development of battlefield
communications; reconnaissance; intelligence signals operations.

In order to achieve these priorities, the government of China has
focused on the use of intelligence services to acquire U.S. military and
industrial technology. That is the main reason why China is using and
improving Cuban capabilities in this area and moving to develop its own
on the island.

After years of hostile relations between China and the Soviet Union,
Russia has again become China's main source of advanced weapons,
including electronic warfare and electronic eavesdropping, (sigint),
equipment.

China has acquired high performance computers, HPC, from the United
States. HPCs are important for many military applications and essential
for some. It is assumed here that China is modernizing Cuba's computer
systems with HPCs.

These computers are in the speed range of 1500-40,000 millions of
theoretical operations per second (MTOPS). HPCs are useful in the
design, development, manufacturing, performance, and testing of
biological weapons, command, control, and communications, information
warfare, collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of
intelligence an in the encryption of communications.

Another potential application of HPCs in Cuba is cryptology-the design
and breaking of encoded communications. This application, such as in the
Bejucal base, demands fast processing, and the ability to handle large
amounts of data. As a point of reference, the U.S. National Security
Agency uses some of the highest performance computers available.

However, it is true also that significant cryptology capability can be
achieved through the use of widely available computer equipment, such as
networked workstations or parallel processors.

Under the revised HPC policy, Cuba falls in Tier 4 with Iraq, Iran,
Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. Tier 4 means a virtual embargo on
all computer exports. This is another factor of the importance of the
new China/Cuba relations. In light of China's aggressive espionage
campaign against U.S. technology, Cuba fits perfectly with Chinese
electronic warfare priorities and electronic collection needs.

Cuba’s Elite Military Group: Special Troops

What are Cuba’s elite forces? Who commands them? Who trains them? Where
is their training camp? What are the main missions they are prepared
for? Since mid 1980s, Cuba established in Los Palacios, Pinar del Río,
in a region known as El Cacho, a special troop military training school.

Named Baraguá School, it is situated in a big valley, near the mountains
of Pinar del Río. It is a very large training camp, with artificial
lakes, and the most modern training technology. The School is exactly
located where the first missiles were seen during the 1962 missile
crisis. The De la Guardia brothers founded the School. It was under
General José Luis Mesa, very close to Raúl Castro. General Mesa, 50,
speaks fluent English, and is well mannered. He was a veteran of
Vietnam, as a young officer, and also of the African wars. He retired
due to health problems. The daily operations are under Colonel Ramírez,
Veteran of Angola, Vietnam, and other war places. Colonel Ramírez is an
expert on this kind of special troop training. Presently they have
assistant from special personnel from China and Vietnam. The special
troop school has about a constant flow of 2500 to 3000 men in training.

Ranging from 18 to 35 years old, they are a breed apart -a cut above the
rest. Unquestionable, they are one of the world’s finest unconventional
warfare experts. Certainly, second only to the United States Special
Troops in this Hemisphere. They are kept on an uncommon physical and
mental caliber. Mature, highly skilled, and superbly trained. They are
always ready to serve anywhere, at any time: Infiltrations, commando
operations, biowarfare, cyber warfare, and espionage. Special troops are
trained to deliver people, equipment, and weapons with surgical
precision. They locate high-value, strategic, movable targets and they
deliver firepower more accurately. They are trained to operate in small
independent units.

They have advanced personal camouflage with enhanced protection against
harsh environments and climatic conditions. Clothing will offer them
individual body armor and safeguards against biological and chemical
agents. They have helmets fitted with enhanced sensory head-up displays
including thermal, image-intensified, and acoustic sensors. External and
imbedded optics enable them to see long distances clearly without using
handheld optical systems.

They have external skeletal systems that will improve individual skills,
enabling special operators to move faster, jump farther, and lift more
weight. Such enhanced physical attributes allow them to deliver more
deadly force with greater accuracy and penetrating power. They also have
miniaturized command, control, and communication functions, as well as
embedded artificial intelligence for situational decision-making. In
Baraguá School, Special troops are trained to perform the following
missions: · Unconventional Warfare, UW: A broad spectrum of military
operations conducted in politically sensitive territory or “enemy” held
territory.

Including interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape,
subversion, sabotage. · Direct Action, DA: Either overt or cover action
against an “enemy” force. Seize, damage, and destroy a target. Short
duration, small scale offensive actions. Ambushes, direct assault
tactics, emplace mines. · Special Reconnaissance, SR: Infiltration
behind “enemy” lines. Collect meteorological, hydrographic, geographic,
and demographic data. · Psychological Operations, PSYOP: Induce or
reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to Cuba objectives.

Influence emotions, motives, and behavior of foreign governments,
organizations, groups, and individuals. They also receive additional
training and skills in freefall parachuting, underwater operations,
target interdiction strategic reconnaissance, and operations and
intelligence. Obviously, this group is strictly an offensive military
group. Cuba is an island, and therefore has not borders to defend from
neighboring countries. The most serious threats from the Special troops
are: biowarfare operations, cyber warfare operations, infiltrations,
commando attacks, kidnapping, espionage.

Conclusions

The United States' dependence on computers makes it more vulnerable than
most countries to cyberattack. The president's Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection has identified eight critical areas in need of
protection: information and communications, electrical power systems,
gas and oil industries, banking and finance, transportation, water
supply systems, emergency services and government services.

Many traditional and non-traditional adversaries of the United
States-according to Louis J. Freeh, Director, FBI, today are
technological sophisticated and have modified their intelligence
methodologies to use advanced technologies to commit espionage. In
telecommunications, even some smaller (Cuba?) intelligence adversaries
now use equipment the FBI is unable to monitor.

The international terrorist threat can be divided- according again to
Louis J. Freeh- in three general categories. Each poses a serious and
distinct threat, and each has a presence in the United States. The first
and most important category, and the concern of this study, is
state-sponsored terrorism. It violates every convention of international
law. State sponsors of terrorism include Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Cuba,
and North Korea. Put simply, these nations view terrorism as a tool of
foreign policy.

Public and private sector organizations that rely on information
technologies are diverse. The result is a revolutionary and systematic
improvement in industrial, services, and commercial processes. However,
as commercial information technologies create advantages, their
increasingly indispensable nature transforms them into high-value targets.

With very few exceptions, attacks against the nation's cyber assets can
be aggregated into one of four categories: crime, terrorism, foreign
intelligence, or war. Regardless of the category, any country can
acquire the capability to conduct limited attacks against information
systems.

Software is one weapon of information-based attacks. Such software
includes computer viruses, Trojan horses, worms, logic bombs and
eavesdropping sniffers. Advanced electronic hardware can also be useful
in information attacks. Examples of such hardware are high-energy radio
frequency (RF) weapons, electromagnetic pulse weapons, RF jamming
equipment, or RF interception equipment.

Such weapons can be used to destroy property and data; intercept
communications or modify traffic; reduce productivity; degrade the
integrity of data, communications, or navigation systems; and deny
crucial services to users of information and telecommunications systems.

The Cuban government is well aware of this vulnerability. Hence, major
terrorists and intelligence services are quickly becoming aware of
exploiting the power of information tools and weapons. The Cuban
government is well aware of this vulnerability.

The increasing value of trade secrets in the global and domestic
marketplaces, and the corresponding spread of technology, have combined
to significantly increase both the opportunities and methods for
conducting electronic espionage.

The security of trade secrets is essential to maintaining the health and
competitiveness of critical segments of the U.S. economy. The U.S.
counterintelligence community has specifically identified the suspicious
collection and acquisition activities of foreign entities from at least
23 countries, including Cuba.

Cuba has acquired the capacity to conduct cyberterrorism also through
simple technology transfer. There are multiple international conferences
on the subject. Anyone can attend these conferences.

There is a BEAMS conference that has gone on for 20 years, a EUROEM
conference that has gone on for over 20 years also. RF weapons can be
made today for a cost of $800 dollars. Therefore, there is no need for a
lot of power, or a lot of money, to affect the infrastructure. This
technology application is quite under the capabilities of Cuba's
electronic development.

Electronic monitoring of communications signals will continue to be the
largest and most important form of secret intelligence. Cuba's main
facility- Bejucal Base- is quite capable of monitoring
telecommunications in the U.S., the Caribbean, and Latin America.

Computers automatically analyze every call or data signal, and can also
identify calls to a target telephone number in U.S. no matter from which
country they originate. Both, Bejucal and EWB, are highly computerized.
They rely on near total interception of international commercial and
satellite communications in order to locate the telephone or other
messages of target individuals.

Cuba's intelligence activities against the United States have grown in
diversity and complexity in the past few years. Press reports of recent
espionage cases involving Russia, South Korea, China, and Cuba are just
the tip of a large and dangerous intelligence iceberg.

The director of the CIA stated before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, 2002, that there are five countries presently conducting
electronic espionage that poses a threat to the United States, they are:
China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba.

Cuba represents a serious threat to the security of the United States in
the cyberwarfare phase of terrorism.

* Dr. Manuel Cereijo, a professor at Florida International University,
Miami, Florida, United States is an expert in Cuba's current issues such
as economy, Havana's support to international terrorism, and the Cuban's
military programs for asymetric, biological and cybernetic warfare.

http://www.lanuevacuba.com/archivo/manuel-cereijo-110.htm