Cuba crackdowns are a sign of perceived strength

Cuba crackdowns are a sign of perceived strength
Paolo Spadoni
Special to the Sentinel

May 14, 2006

In a recent Los Angeles Times article about Fidel Castro's push to
preserve his legacy, a group of U.S. scholars analyzed the Castro
government's latest crackdowns on corruption and capitalist practices in
Cuba. They fairly pointed out that Cuba's campaign against petty theft
and black market activities as well as rollbacks of the timid economic
reforms implemented in the early 1990s are part of a general strategy to
increase efficiency, stem income inequalities in the society, and rally
people around socialist ideals.

Regardless of their merits and likelihood for success, these actions
represent an attempt by the island's authorities to preserve the
anti-capitalist legacy of Castro, who will turn 80 in August, and
breathe new life into the egalitarian precepts of his revolution.

What struck me the most in the article was a comment by Caleb McCarry,
the U.S. State Department's Cuba transition coordinator, who depicted
the crackdowns as "a sign of weakness and fear on the part of the
regime." While the U.S. official might be correct in his prediction that
Castro's efforts will fail to stir up the revolutionary fervor among
Cubans, he provided an interpretation of the current situation on the
island that is clearly out of touch with reality. His portrayal is at
least as misguided as Washington's repeated claims that the present
regime in Havana is on the verge of collapse and that U.S. sanctions are
hastening a democratic transition on the island.

A government might show signs of distress or debility when it is forced
to introduce changes it stoutly resists as a result of severe economic
problems, domestic and external pressure, or a combination of these
factors. But how can one say this is the case when a government is
re-centralizing the overall economy, increasing its control over
society, and practically backtracking on several reforms it would have
never implemented under different conditions?

This is an indication of perceived strength, not weakness.

In the early 1990s, amid a deep economic recession and the
intensification of U.S. sanctions, Cuban authorities opened the island
to foreign direct investment and began to actively promote international
tourism. Between 1993 and 1994, they also adopted a number of reforms,
including the legalization of the use of U.S. dollars and the
authorization of self-employment.

At that time, the Castro government appeared, indeed, to be on its last
legs, and it had no choice but to loosen its grip on the country in
order to survive. Limited capitalist-style economic reforms not only
helped Cuba to recover from the crisis following the demise of the
former Soviet Union, but also led almost immediately to profound income
inequalities among Cuban citizens, rampant corruption, and pervasive
stealing in state-run dollar stores.

In the second half of the 1990s, theft of state resources such as
gasoline and many other products became widespread on the island, and
Cubans with access to hard currency began to enjoy substantially higher
living standards than the rest of the population. Perfectly aware of
this situation, and fearing that a strong movement toward a revival of
socialist practices could have backfired, Cuban officials tolerated
various kinds of illegalities and temporarily set aside their
traditional commitment to an egalitarian society. The idea was to
stimulate the economy with necessary liberalizing measures and suffer
their inevitable and undesirable social consequences in order to regain
state control at a later time.

Although Havana has always denounced the evils of capitalism, the early
signals of a slowdown, and, in some cases reversal, of economic reforms
came in the late 1990s at a time when the Cuban economy was experiencing
some notable growth. This process has gathered pace in the past three
years as closer ties with China and especially Venezuela have provided a
new lifeline to the cash-strapped Cuban government.

Emboldened by unprecedented hard currency revenues, the island's
authorities have stepped up their efforts to re-centralize the economy,
waged war against private enterprises and corruption, raised salaries
and pensions, and made substantial investments in power generation,
waterworks, Chinese consumer products and food imports. At the same
time, they have raised great expectations for further improvement among
Cubans by announcing a spectacular economic performance and promising
new investments in house construction and public transportation.

Nothing happens by coincidence in Cuba. The latest crackdowns on the
island are calculated moves of a government that feels stronger and in
better shape than it has been in years. By recognizing this, Washington
would not only offer a less distorted view of the current situation in
Cuba but also increase its chances to formulate a more effective foreign
policy toward its communist neighbor.

Paolo Spadoni is a visiting lecturer in the department of political
science at Stetson University in DeLand.

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