Why Cuba Will Still Be Anti-American After Castro

Why Cuba Will Still Be Anti-American After Castro
By Jaime Suchlicki
Mar 4 2013, 11:00 AM ET 110

In totalitarian regimes, the road to bureaucratic success is not through
hard work but through loyalty.

Dressed in an impeccable, custom-tailored suit and a Versace tie,
instead of his usual military fatigues, General Raul Castro addressed
the Cuban Parliament on February 24. He did not discuss political or
economic reforms. Instead, he announced he would be stepping down from
power at the end of the five-year term for which he had just been
elected. If the Pope retires, "I can also retire," he explained. Yet the
Cubans would have to wait for the "younger" brother to reach 87 years of
age to see the end of the Castro dynasty.

But not so fast. There are other Castros in the wings. In particular,
Raul's son, Alejandro Castro Espin, a colonel in Cuba's intelligence
apparatus, could be groomed in the future by becoming a general and a
member of the Communist Party Politburo, Cuba's ruling body. In the
meantime, Raul appointed a younger Communist, Miguel Diaz Canel, as
first vice president among five other vice presidents. A hardline party
apparatchik, Diaz Canel, a 52-year-old engineer and former Minister of
Education, grew up under Fidel's and Raul's shadow as an obedient and
disciplined Marxist. A protégé of Ramon Machado Ventura, an old
communist and (till Sunday) first vice president, Diaz Canel mirrors the
ideological rigidity of his mentor.

"I was not chosen to be president to restore capitalism to Cuba. I
was elected to defend, maintain and continue to perfect socialism and
not to destroy it."

A second appointment followed. This one for President of the National
Assembly (Cuba's Parliament). Raul picked another old and loyal
Communist, Esteban Lazo. Lazo has been the only prominent Cuban black to
occupy any high-ranking position in the predominantly white-controlled
Cuban government. A bland, obedient bureaucrat, Lazo will follow the
Parliaments' tradition of rubber-stamping the laws issued by the leadership.

The two appointments seemed more symbolic than significant. Raul Castro
wanted to send a double message: that the octogenarian Cuban leadership
was now giving way to a new, younger generation of leaders. Also, aware
of the unhappiness among Cuba's black population, impoverished and
neglected by the regime, Castro wanted to elevate a loyal supporter to
the ceremonial position in the Parliament. It is doubtful that the
majority of Cubans (more than 60 percent of whom are black and mulatto)
will be appeased by these appointments or renew their belief in the
Cuban revolutionary leadership. Similarly, the appointment of a young
hardline bureaucrat is unlikely to gain much favor with Cuba's youth,
hoping for deeper political and economic changes.

Raul Castro seemed to have overlooked legal requirements in his own
constitution, which calls for the Party's Political Bureau to be the key
group to recommend a post-Castro successor. If Raul dies or becomes
incapacitated, the Politburo will recommend and the Council of State
will decide who will be Cuba's new president. Since the Politburo is
dominated by the military, it's obvious who will make the final
decision. Not only does the military control the Party's Politburo, but
more than 60 percent of the island's state enterprises, including the
all-important tourist industry, are in the hands of the military.

Diaz Canel's tenure as first vice president may follow the fate of other
younger leaders promoted earlier by Fidel Castro. Former Czars of the
economy Carlos Aldana and Carlos Lage and former foreign ministers
Roberto Robaina and Felipe Perez Roque were all promoted in the past to
those key positions, only to be removed by Castro when he doubted their
loyalty or resented their prominence.

It is one of the ironies of totalitarian regimes that the road to
bureaucratic success is not through efficiency or hard work but through
loyalty. Perhaps Diaz Canel has learned this lesson in his short career.
Without any popular support or base of power in the military, his future
may be as precarious as those of his comrades fired from their jobs and
now living in oblivion.

In the meantime, Raul Castro will still rule with an iron fist. Some
Cuba observers expect that Raul will open up the economy and even
provide some political changes. Not so soon. With Fidel alive, or even
when he is dead, it would be difficult for Raul to reject his brother's
legacy of political and economic centralization. His legitimacy is based
on being Fidel's heir. Any major move to reject Fidel's "teachings"
would create uncertainty among Cuba's ruling elites - party and
military. It could also increase instability as some would advocate
rapid change, while others cling to more orthodox policies. Cubans could
see this as an opportunity for mobilization, demanding faster reforms.

For Raul Castro, the uncertainties of uncorking the genie's bottle of
reform in Cuba are greater than keeping the lid on and moving
cautiously. For the past 52 years, political considerations have always
dictated economic policies. He had been the longest serving Minister of
Defense (47 years). He presided over the worst period of political
repression and economic centralization in Cuba and is responsible for
numerous executions after he and his brother assumed power, and some
while in Mexico and the Sierra Maestra before reaching power.

During his speech to Parliament, Raul Castro scoffed at any idea that
the country would soon abandon socialism and embrace profound economic
changes. "I was not chosen to be president to restore capitalism to
Cuba," he emphasized. "I was elected to defend, maintain and continue to
perfect socialism and not to destroy it."

General Castro faces significant challenges in his second term. A
non-productive and highly dependent economy on Venezuela and other
foreign sources, popular unhappiness, the need to maintain order and
discipline among the population and the need to increase productivity.
Raul is critically dependent on the military. Lacking the charisma of
his brother, he still needs the support of key party leaders and
technocrats within the government bureaucracy.

The critical challenge for Raul Castro will be to balance the need to
improve the economy and satisfy the needs of the population with
maintaining political control. Too rapid economic reforms may lead to an
unraveling of political control, a fact feared by Raul, the military,
and other allies keen on remaining in power. A partial solution may be
to provide more consumer goods to the population, including food, but
without any structural economic changes.

Similarly, any serious overtures to the U.S. do not seem likely in the
near future. It would mean the rejection of one of Fidel Castro's main
legacies: anti-Americanism. It may create uncertainty within the
government, leading to frictions and factionalism. It would require the
weakening of Cuba's anti-American alliance with radical regimes in Latin
America and elsewhere.

Raul is unwilling to renounce the support and close collaboration of
countries like Venezuela, China, Iran and Russia in exchange for an
uncertain relationship with the United States. At a time that
anti-Americanism is strong in Latin America and the Middle East, Raul's
policies are more likely to remain closer to regimes that are not
particularly friendly to the United States and that demand little from
Cuba in return for generous aid.

Raul does not seem ready to provide meaningful and irreversible
concessions for a U.S. - Cuba normalization. Like his brother in the
past, public statements and speeches are politically motivated and
directed at audiences in Cuba, the United States and Europe. Serious
negotiations on important issues are not carried out in speeches from
the plaza. They are usually carried out through the normal diplomatic
avenues open to the Cubans in Havana, Washington and the United Nations
or other countries, if they wish. These avenues have never been closed
as evidenced by the migration accord and the anti-hijacking agreement
between the United States and Cuba.

Raul remains a loyal follower and cheerleader of Fidel's anti-American
policies.

The issue between Cuba and the U.S. is not about negotiations or
talking. These are not sufficient. There has to be a willingness on the
part of the Cuban leadership to offer real concessions - in the area of
human rights and political and economic openings as well as cooperation
on anti-terrorism and drug interdiction - for the United States to
change it policies.

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/why-cuba-will-still-be-anti-american-after-castro/273680/