René Gómez Manzano
It is a well-known that Cuba's current political system originates from
the Constitution of 1975, which went into effect in 1976. What is less
known is how the amended 1975 constitution during the 1992 general
reform changed the process of electing deputies to the National Assembly
of People's Power. Before the Constitution was amended deputies were
chosen simply by municipal assemblies, whereas they are now directly
elected by voters.
Candidates for a position in the National Assembly of People's Power
have been nominated in a complex system since the constitutional reform.
Each municipality nominates one deputy per every twenty thousand
inhabitants or a fraction higher than ten thousand. However, by law
there are never less than two deputies nominated under Article 14 of the
Elections Act - Act No. 72 of October 29, 1992. Furthermore,
municipalities with more than one hundred thousand inhabitants may be
subdivided into districts of no less than fifty thousand inhabitants
(Art. 15 EA).
When analysing how these changes affected the supreme power of the
existing state, the first thing we have to emphasize is that there is no
freedom of proposal for who can be potential candidates. On the
contrary, the Elections Act provides for a system of candidacy
commissions – apart from one national commission there are several
provincial and municipal commissions – and it is these commissions who
play a key role in the whole process of nominating the candidates (Art.
67 EA). The commissions are formed by representatives of the following
mass organizations (Art.68 EA, number of representatives is not
stipulated in the Act though):
• Confederation of Cuban Workers (Central de Trabajadores de Cuba)
• Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (Comités de Defensa de la
Revolución)
• Federation of Cuban Women (Federación de Mujeres Cubanas)
• National Association of Small Farmers (Asociación Nacional de
Agricultores Pequeños)
• University Students' Federation (Federación Estudiantil Universitaria)
• Federation of Secondary School Students (Federación de Estudiantes de
la Enseñanza Media)
Official propaganda constantly points out that the Cuban Communist
Party, the only political party, does not make any proposals for slates
of candidates. This statement is true in a strictly formal sense.
Nevertheless, what lies underneath this recurrent topic of official
propaganda is completely false. The fact that the Communist Party does
not formally intervene in the nomination of candidates does not mean
that the whole process could be called democratic and non-totalitarian.
Anyone with even superficial knowledge of Cuba's current political
situation would have little doubt that these "mass organizations" are
controlled and supervised by the Communist Party. The Party uses these
institutions as "mouthpieces" to impose its policies over the various
social sectors of Cuban society.
Even if we accepted that the current system of nominating candidates was
not a manifestation of the absolute power a single party state can wield
over an entire society, the chosen method would not lose its
totalitarian nature. Obviously, when there are only six organizations
that can make proposals by nominating representatives in the candidacy
commissions, and no freedom of proposal, we are actually dealing with a
new type of totalitarianism. In essence, the aforementioned six
organizations make up a kind of cartel which imposes its power over the
society.
It is quite clear from a formal point of view that the system is not
equitable. A certain number of citizens do not belong to any of these
six mass organizations, and therefore, they have no representation in
the process of proposal. On the other hand, some citizens are members of
several organizations, and in theory, are "over-represented".
Furthermore, a large percentage of the Federation of Secondary School
Students members have not even come of age to vote.
Yet, is there some grain of truth that these mass organizations could
have nothing to do with the single party or could even be considered
independent? If any part of this was true, then these organizations
would be breaking Article 5 of the current Constitution. In that
provision, the Cuban Communist Party is clearly defined as the supreme
authority of society which exists to coordinate and channel the efforts
of the common people towards the higher goals of building socialism and
realizing a communist society. Furthermore, Article 7 outlines the role
of mass organization by saying that they bring together different social
groups, in order to stand for their specific interests and involve them
in construction, consolidation and defence of the socialist society.
Considering these legal circumstances, could some spokesman of the
regime explain how these organizations devoted to the construction of
socialist society could possibly be independent of the party which
coordinates and channels the common efforts into building socialism? Or
is this provision of the Constitution actually being broken?
I have already mentioned how complex the nomination process is for
deputies of the national Assembly of People's Power under the 1992
Elections act. I hopefully have made it clear that the legislative
methods being used are highly dubious. In fact, there are several rules
which mix up provisions intended for the election of deputies and of
those that regard the election of delegates to provincial assemblies.
However, we should look at what is and isn't clear.
The National Candidacy Commission is responsible for preparing the
proposals (Art. 87 EA) for the candidates and sending them to the
National Electoral Commission. The National Electoral Commission is
required to verify whether the pre-election candidates proposed meet all
legal requirements. Once this is completed, the National Candidacy
Commission is in charge of sending these certified proposals to
particular Municipal Candidacy Commissions who in turn present them to
Municipal Assemblies of People's Power (Art. 88).
The fact that the number of citizens included into each pre-election
candidacy has to be at least double to the number of deputies which are
to be elected (Art. 89) is relatively straightforward. Candidates are
nominated by Municipal Assemblies of People's Power and their number has
to be equal to the number of deputies that the municipality in question
shall elect (Art. 92). However, the Elections Act does not strictly
define which body is responsible for considering the citizens proposed
by the National Candidacy Commission (the number of these citizens is no
less than double to the total number of posts) and for choosing those
who should actually stand as candidates. By systematically analysing the
Elections Act we could conclude that this power might belong to the
Municipal Candidacy Commission. This conclusion is based on the fact
that the Municipal Assembly, a body elected by the people, is wholly
subordinate to the Candidacy Commission. We can, for instance, find the
following provisions:
• In case the Municipal Assembly agrees to exclude one of the candidates
proposed by the Candidacy Commission, the President of the Candidacy
Commission puts forward a new proposal (Art. 96, sections 3 and 6).
• If some of the proposed citizens does not obtain the majority of votes
(in a voting by raising hands), the Municipal Candidacy Commission will
again make a new proposal (Art. 96, sections 5 and 6). 1
What is the purpose of these complex constraints? In my opinion and
without any doubts, the purpose of the current system is as follows: for
anyone to be proposed as a deputy to the National Assembly, the citizen
has to be approved by three separate organs of the state – the National
Candidacy Commission, the Municipal Candidacy Commission and the
Municipal Assembly of People's Power. It is extremely difficult, if not
absolutely impossible, for any "improper" person to be nominated with
this process is place. Not only is it impossible for opposition or
independent candidates to run for election, but even for anyone whom the
establishment may find just a little unpleasant. We should also bear in
mind that the make up of these bodies are different - at least in case
of candidacy commissions. While municipal assemblies are the only bodies
elected by people (despite the fact that in countries like Cuba, the
concept of "elected by people" is somewhat limited), national and
municipal candidacy commissions are appointed by the previously
mentioned cartel of six mass organizations. For these two different
commissions to agree to a certain candidate, this particular candidate
must necessarily meet the expectations of the Party. Otherwise, we may
be almost absolutely sure that this citizen would be rejected either by
the candidacy commissions or by the municipal assembly.
Obviously, all these aspects would be of importance in case of some
hypothetical discrepancy in the future. However, up to this moment,
there has been no such situation.
Once the candidacies are agreed upon in all of the country's
municipalities voting takes place. I am deliberately saying voting
as opposed to electing, because there cannot be election without choice.
Those candidates who have obtained more than a half of the valid votes
are considered as "elected" (Art. 124 EA). And who determines which
votes are valid? The Elections Act does not provide for a clear
definition on this point. In case of electing deputies, the Election
Act explicitly recognizes the right of electors to vote for all the
candidates or for some of them (Art. 110, section 2). The law also
stipulates that the ballots where it is impossible to determine the will
of the voter will be nullified (Art. 114, section 1).
Bearing in mind the intensive propaganda which the regime launches
before every general election in order to persuade the citizens to "vote
in unity", that means to vote in favour of all the candidates, I believe
it is quite bold to claim that the will of the voter cannot be
determined in blank and crossed ballots or in ballots with a written
comment against the system or against the candidates. Nevertheless, in
practice this has so far been the most frequent interpretation.
Therefore, all ballots which are blank, crossed or include any comments
are not taken as ballots where voters clearly express their opposition
to the regime and to its candidates, but as invalid votes that do not
count. Reducing this to the absurd, let's imagine the following
situation. There is a municipality where only one citizen "votes in
unity", whereas others, the rest of the inhabitants, make their ballot
somehow invalid. Yet all the candidates would actually succeed, since
they would have obtained more than a half of the valid votes, or in
other words, they would have obtained one vote out of total one…
In other words, whoever wants to express by vote his disagreement with
the single candidacy, will be forced to vote for at least one of the
proposed candidates, otherwise his ballot will be invalid and will be
nullified. And this means that such a citizen will actually have to
become an accomplice of the very same system he wishes to combat.
Although in the near future this is something highly improbable, let's
imagine for a while, that with this mechanism or another, one or more
deputy seats of a particular municipality or district remain vacant.
What would happen? The Elections Act provides for such a possibility in
the article 125. In such a case, the Council of State would have the
following options:
i) to leave these seats vacant;
ii) to empower the Municipal Assembly with the election; or
iii) to call for new elections.
A second round of the elections to the National Assembly would only be
held if the Council of State took the third option. This is in stark
contrast with the elections of delegates to the municipal
assemblies where a second, or even a third or fourth, round is held as a
rule (Articles 180 and 121 EA). And needless to say that while the only
issue discussed in the municipal elections is which of the two
or more residents will be the elected delegate, general elections
determine the make-up of the supreme body of the state.
I should stress that the second round of the elections to the National
Assembly is really just one of the possible scenarios. In such a case,
the Council of State would have different options, all legal ones, on
how to face the situation and it could make a choice that would best
suit its political interests.
From the legal point of view, it would be interesting to briefly
analyse what would happen in the following situation. There is a
municipality or district which shall elect for instance two deputies. In
the first round of the elections, the majority of the citizens vote for
only one of the candidates, and therefore, this candidate is the only
one elected and the other seat remains vacant. Should the Council of
State decide that the seat be filled by means of public voting, the only
valid ballots in the second round would be those in favour of the new
single candidate, because the other ballots would be declared invalid.
I believe that all the measures mentioned in this paper are to ensure
that the National Assembly of People's Power will keep on providing
unanimous support to the current leadership of the country. What about
you? Do you share my opinion?
1 The passages regarding this topic in the Elections Act are so poorly
written that none of the few authors who have so far published some
works on this issue offers any strict interpretation. You may, for
instance, have a look at the proceedings from the Seminar on
Elections and Human Rights in Cuba and Latin America (Havana, November
24-25, 1997) [Seminario sobre Elecciones y Derechos Humanos en Cuba y
América Latina, IIDH, San José, Costa Rica, 1998]. The conference papers
on Cuban Elections Act and on Cuban electoral system seem to avoid the
topic like the plague. See pages 204-209, 258-259 and 267-268 of the
above mentioned proceedings.
http://www.miscelaneasdecuba.net/web/article.asp?artID=12210
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