Posted on Saturday, 08.02.14
New revelations about Cuban spy Ana Montes
Details about Cuban spy Ana Montes from the Department of Defense
Inspector General's 2005 report — only now declassified — shed new light
on the case.
BY BRIAN LATELL
SPECIAL TO THE MIAMI HERALD
For 16 years, Ana Belen Montes spied for Cuba from increasingly
responsible positions at the Defense Intelligence Agency. If Havana has
ever run a higher level or more valuable mole inside the American
defense establishment, that has never been revealed.
When she was arrested in late September 2001, Montes was about the
equivalent in rank of a colonel. She had access to sensitive
compartmented intelligence. Strangely, for one so openly enamored of
Fidel Castro, her superiors considered her one of the best Cuba analysts
anywhere in government.
Despite the importance of her case, some of the most tantalizing
questions about her spying have never been publicly answered. Could the
calamity of her treason have been avoided? What was learned about Cuban
intelligence tradecraft? How was she discovered? And, of enduring
concern, did she work with other American spies thus far undetected or
not prosecuted?
Thanks to researcher Jeffrey Richelson and the National Security
Archive, new light has finally been shed on the Montes case. Because of
their efforts, a 180 page study completed by the Department of Defense
Inspector General in 2005 has recently been declassified. It is heavily
redacted; many pages, including the CIA's extensive comments, blacked
out. Yet, a quantity of surprising new details are now on the public record.
Montes's decision to spy for Cuba was "coolly deliberate." Enticed by a
Cuban access agent in Washington, they traveled together to New York in
December 1984. Montes met with intelligence officers posted under cover
at the Cuban mission to the United Nations.
She "unhesitatingly agreed" to work with them and travel clandestinely
to Cuba as soon as possible. The following March, she went there via
Spain and Czechoslovakia. The Pentagon report does not state the
obvious: while there, she must have received specialized training in
intelligence tradecraft.
Then, with Cuban encouragement, she applied for a job at DIA. A standard
background investigation was conducted, but we now know that serious
concerns about her suitability were raised. Without elaboration, the
Pentagon report indicates that they included "falsification of her
Master of Arts degree from Johns Hopkins (University) and her
trustworthiness."
DIA did not require applicants to submit to a pre-employment polygraph
exam. So, Montes, a trained Cuban espionage agent with a problematic
past was cleared and hired. She began her double duties in September 1985.
After her arrest, Montes insisted that she had the "moral right" to
provide information to Cuba. In her view, she did not work for Cuba, but
with Cuban officials. They felt "mutual respect and understanding" she
thought, as "comrades in the struggle."
The Cubans were skilled in manipulating and controlling her. She told
interrogators after her apprehension that she considered herself the
equal of her "Cuban comrades, not a menial espionage tool." They let her
believe she "maintained significant control," although she consistently
left "security matters, including meeting site security,
countersurveillance, and transmission security" to her handlers.
Montes said they were "thoughtful, sensitive to her needs, very good to
me." They went to "special lengths to assure her they had complete
confidence in her." They allowed her a long, loose leash, easier because
they were not paying for her extraordinary services.
Initially in New York, and later at her request in the Washington area,
she met with her handlers as often as once every two or three weeks,
usually on weekends. Everything about her second covert trip to Cuba is
redacted in the Pentagon report.
In 1991, Montes underwent a seemingly routine security reinvestigation.
She was asked about foreign travel, and lied. Questioned about
inaccuracies in her original application for employment, she confessed
that she had misrepresented an incident in her past. Feigning innocence,
Montes claimed that she "did not understand the seriousness of being
truthful and honest at the time."
Her questionable case was then reviewed at a higher level. The
adjudicator reported that "while Montes seemed to have a tendency 'to
twist the truth' to her own needs and her honesty was still a cause of
concern, adverse security action was unlikely." Again, she had slipped
through. Her high level clearances were recertified.
Soon after, she brazenly submitted a freedom of information request for
her own government records. She must have been concerned that something
adverse had been discovered. Investigative material was released. She
gave the surprised Cubans copies.
She apparently visited Cuba a third time after being selected to
participate in the prestigious Director of Central Intelligence
"Exceptional Analyst Program" in 1992. This time her travel to the
island, purportedly to conduct research, was legal.
In 1996, she was questioned by a DIA special agent after another DIA
employee reported concerns about her. Serious doubts were raised about
her veracity, but the allegations could not be substantiated.
None of this seems to have contributed to her eventual unmasking. So,
how was she discovered? Surprisingly, revealing information seeps
through the Pentagon's report. "We got lucky," a counterintelligence
official observed. An entirely blacked-out section entitled
"Serendipity" suggests the same.
By April 1998, a coordinated search for a Cuban spy was underway,
according to the report. At first it was thought most likely the quarry
was a CIA employee. Investigators were following a crucial clue: the
unknown spy had apparently traveled to the Guantanamo naval base as
Montes had apparently done on official DIA business.
The breakthrough had seemingly come earlier, however. According to the
Pentagon report, Montes was informed shortly after her arrest that
investigators "had information from a senior official in the Cuban
intelligence service concerning a Cuban penetration agent that
implicated Montes." It appears that this information propelled the
investigation that resulted in her arrest.
Who was this mysterious, previously unacknowledged source? From the
language of the Pentagon report, it was probably not a defector, but
more likely a renegade or compromised Cuban intelligence officer. If so,
Montes was done in by one of her own so-called "comrades."
Did she work with other American spies? The report is ambiguous; it
states that after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 pressure
intensified to arrest Montes. The FBI preferred to wait, however, in
order "to monitor Montes's activities with the prospect that she may
have eventually led the FBI to others in the Cuban spy network."
Did government censors inadvertently confirm the existence of a larger
spy ring? If in fact there was evidence of one, it may be a long time
before more is known.
It is now clear, however, that Montes's apprehension was not just the
result of excellent intelligence work. She told investigators after her
arrest that a week earlier she had learned that she was under
surveillance. She could have decided then to flee to Cuba, and probably
would have made it there safely.
But she said that "she couldn't give up on the people (she) was
helping." Montes is serving a 25 year prison sentence.
Latell is the author of "Castro's Secrets: Cuban Intelligence, the CIA,
and the Assassination of John F. Kennedy." He is a research associate in
Cuban studies at the University of Miami.
Source: New revelations about Cuban spy Ana Montes - Issues & Ideas -
MiamiHerald.com -
http://www.miamiherald.com/2014/08/02/4267428/new-revelations-about-cuban-spy.html
No comments:
Post a Comment