Cuba: A New Castro Steps to the Fore

Cuba: A New Castro Steps to the Fore


Stratfor
Analysis
Infosearch:
Armando F. Mastrapa III
Director
Research Dept.
La Nueva Cuba
November 1, 2006



Summary

The increasingly fragile health of Cuban leader Fidel Castro has raised
the question of how his brother and chosen successor, Raul, will run the
country after Fidel's death. With Raul supported by the economically
ambitious old communist guard, which controls the military, continued
liberal economic reforms in Cuba are likely. However, this faction could
face challenges from an influential group of young revolutionaries with
Bolivarian ideals and ties to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.

Analysis

In response to rumors of his death, Cuban leader Fidel Castro appeared
on television Oct. 29, reading that day's newspaper. He is clearly still
alive, but his increasing frailty highlights what has been on everyone's
mind since Castro handed over power to his brother Raul on July 30: the
line of succession.

Lacking Fidel's charisma, Raul -- his chosen successor -- will have to
give the Cuban people a reason to support him. The most probable option
is for Raul, who is 75 years old, to use his military power base to
maintain a secure grip on the country and continue the liberalization
efforts begun under his brother's rule. However, Raul faces internal
challenges, such as the ideological struggle between the old guard of
the revolution and the younger factions of potentially more leftist
politicians, who might be able to woo support from unhappy military
personnel unless the country's deeply rooted economic problems are
addressed.

Raul's power rests on the support of the military. As the driving force
behind reforming the military into a meritocracy, he secured the armed
forces' loyalty. However, the military is experiencing the same wealth
gap as the rest of the country; upper-level officers have accumulated
large amounts of wealth from the tourist economy while lower-level
servicemen have been forced to survive on their rations. If this does
not change, the military could begin looking for alternatives,
especially once Raul is gone. One choice might be a group of young
politicians with close ties to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez --
nicknamed the "Taliban" for their radically leftist views.

Chavez would be substantially weakened if his Cuban ally's ideology
drifted away from his leftist agenda and anti-U.S. stance. The
Venezuelan president has ostentatiously shown his support for Cuba since
Fidel fell ill, taking every photo opportunity with the ailing leader
and appearing before the world as the heir to the Cuban revolution.
Chavez plans to use his close ties to the younger, more radically
leftist members of government to increase his influence in Cuba -- which
could conflict with any inclinations Raul might have to move toward a
more open economic model that would include the United States, such as
that of China. But Chavez might not be a safe ally; his power is tied to
increasingly overspent oil revenues and his illusions of regional
support are dissipating.

In the past, Raul has used his position as military leader to initiate
violent crackdowns on citizen unrest. But authoritarian domination will
not quell the unrest brewing just below Cuba's surface. This discontent
is a result of the economic downturn of the 1990s, during which economic
subsidization from the Soviet Union disappeared, plunging the country
into economic chaos. In an attempt to generate income, the government
opened up the country's tourist industry to foreign investment. Now,
workers in the industry, such as taxi drivers, often make more than
doctors. Military commanders are also involved in running the Tourism
Ministry and are uniquely situated to make money off the industry. This
situation has generated an unequal income distribution that has
embittered much of the Cuban population, weakening support for a
government people see as increasingly corrupt.

Under Fidel, Raul oversaw government policies that paved the way to a
more liberalized economy. He also pursued a subtle detente with the
United States. It was Raul, not Fidel, who led the move toward
integrating low-level capitalist enterprises into the Cuban economy.
Raul has also made quiet attempts to establish contact with military
elites in the U.S. government, indicating through back channels that the
Cuban military could help with issues of mutual interest such as
counternarcotics and immigration control. In 2002, Raul even offered
publicly to help the U.S. military by returning al Qaeda members should
any escape from Guantanamo Bay. Despite the military insignificance of
the offer, it was a notable gesture of political goodwill by a longtime
U.S. adversary that shares much of the international community's disdain
for the treatment of U.S. detainees.

Raul will continue the gradual shift in economic activity in Cuba. He
will likely seek outside investment in ways that will diversify the
economy, moving away from relying completely on tourism as a source of
income. Cuba will look to the examples of other countries transitioning
from communism, such as Vietnam and China. Further, he will be eager to
encourage exceptions in the U.S. trade embargo and thus expand Cuban
access to U.S. goods.

Raul's leadership will face significant challenges, but by maintaining
the revolutionary rhetoric and further integrating market-based reforms,
Raul will attempt to ease Cuba into this transition. Change will not
come overnight, but once Fidel is gone, Raul can continue to liberalize
the economy without his older brother watching over his shoulder.

http://www.lanuevacuba.com/nuevacuba/notic-06-11-160.htm